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NOTE
The "New Fraud" Becomes No Fraud:
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green
A wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Santa Fe Industries owned
ninety-five percent of the capital stock of Kirby Lumber Corporation, a
Delaware corporation. For the sole purpose of returning Kirby to private
status by eliminating the publicly held shares, Santa Fe created a holding
company and merged it into Kirby pursuant to the Delaware short form
merger statute.' Plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Kirby, were then
notified of the transaction and informed that they must exchange their stock
for an amount of cash previously determined by the defendants, Santa Fe
and Morgan Stanley and Company, or, if dissatisfied with the exchange rate,
seek appraisal of the value of the stock in state court. 2 Plaintiffs brought an
action seeking damages and rescission of the merger under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and SEC rule I0b-5, 4 alleging undervaluation of their stock and no prior notice of the merger. The district court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to allege subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief on the grounds that the
complaint failed to allege nondisclosure or misrepresentation. 5 The court of
appeals reversed, finding that a "going private" short form merger gives rise
to a federal cause of action for minority shareholders when the merger is
performed without either a justifiable corporate purpose or prior notice, and
when there is an inordinately low valuation of the stock. The court held that
in such a case no allegation of misrepresentation or non-disclosure is required for stating a cause of action under rule lOb-5. 6 Held, reversed: The
1. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975). The statute has been amended as of July 1, 1976. Id.
(Supp. 1976). A short form merger is a special type of cash-out merger. A cash-out merger is
one in which the shareholders of a corlioration being acquired can be compelled to take cash in
the amount determined by the merger agreement. In a long form merger the agreement must be
ratified by the stockholders of both companies. When the two companies are parent and
subsidiary, and the parent owns most of the stock of the subsidiary, no shareholder approval is
necessary; this latter type of transaction is a short form merger.
2. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1975). The statute has been amended as of July 1, 1976. Id.
(Supp. 1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
5. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). For a case involving a long
form merger with a similar result in the court of appeals see Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 333
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short form merger complained of involved neither deception nor manipulation as those words are used in section 10(b), and without an allegation of at
least one of those concepts a claim of fraud and fiduciary breach does not

state a cause of action under rule lOb-5 or section 10(b). Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292, 51 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1977).

I.

THE "GOING PRIVATE"

SYNDROME

A. Background
"Going private" is a term used to describe the efforts of a publicly held
corporation to become a privately held corporation. 7 Going private techniques 8 are conflict transactions where the minority stockholders are ousted

for the benefit of the majority. 9 The parties to the transaction are the
company and the people acting for or controlling the company. Since those
controlling the company also have a personal stake in the outcome, the
transaction is deprived of any arm's-length quality.1 0
The results of these conflict transactions are often criticized as an oppres-2
sion of the minority stockholders. 1 With respect to short form mergers,
this charge of oppression is grounded on inequities in state law which permit
a board of directors unilaterally to determine the value of their company's

3
stock with no input from the minority stockholders.
A minority stockholder who objects to a short form merger may seek
appraisal of the value of the stock in state court 4 or challenge the merger

itself under state law.' 5 Neither of these alternatives, however, provides an
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded for a determination of mootness, 97 S. Ct. 228, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 162 (1976).
7. The SEC suggests two definitions of "going private":
[1] [Any transaction or series of transactions engaged in by an issuer or its
affiliate, which would, if successful, permit the issuer to cease filing reports
under the Exchange Act. [Or,]
[2] any transaction by an issuer or its affiliate which might directly or
indirectly result in the issuer being able to cease filing reports under the Exchange Act or which might result in a significant impairment in the liquidity of
the trading market in its equity securities.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11231, 40 Fed. Reg. 7947, 7948 (1975).
8. There are five techniques, all of which can be used alone or in combination with one
another: (a) the repurchase of shares other than through cash tender offers, (b) cash tender
offers, (c) exchange offers, (d) reorganization through cash-out merger or sale of assets, and (e)
a reverse stock split. Moore, Going Private: Techniques and Problems of Eliminatingthe Public
Shareholder, I J. CORP. L. 321 (1976).
9. When the minority stock is eliminated the majority stockholders benefit from higher
earnings per share, higher book value per share, and larger proportional control for their
holdings. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD (New Matter) § 4.7, at 400.2 (Supp. 1975).
10. I A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 4.7 (000), at 83-84 (Supp. 1972-73).
11. F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS: EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION
OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1976); O'Neal & Janke, Utilizing Rule lOb-5for Remedying SqueezeOuts or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 327 (1975).
12. See note I supra.
13. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1975); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.16 (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77). These statutes permit a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the capital
stock of a subsidiary to merge the parent and subsidiary upon approval by the parent's board of
directors and to provide for the amount and method of payment for subsidiary shares not
owned by the parent. The only notice required to be given to minority shareholders is that they
be told of the merger within 10 days after the effective date of the transaction.
14. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1976-77); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 5.16 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
15. The most successful challenges to the mergers under state law use the principles of
fiduciary duty. See Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
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adequate remedy. 6 Judicial appraisal involves delay and expense, 17 and the
power of the majority to determine the timing of the merger could obscure
accurate valuation of the stock.' 8 Even if successful, appraisal fails to
consider the tax impact on the minority stockholder whose holdings are
suddenly liquidated. 9
20
Where the minority stockholder is able to challenge the merger at all, he
2
generally has to prove fraud resulting from deception. ' In view of the lack
of success of minority stockholders in proving deception, 22 this option
provides little help. Besides the lack of substantive remedies, a minority
stockholder in state court has to cope with serious procedural obstacles
25
24
23
relating to discovery, service of process, and security for expenses.
L.J. 663 (1974); Fillman, Cash and Property as Consideration in a Merger or Consolidation, 62
Nw. U.L. REV. 837 (1968).
16. See generally Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 987 (1974); Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG.
L.J. 33 (1975); Solomon, Going Private: Business Practices, Legal Mechanics, Judicial Standards and Proposals for Reform, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 141 (1975); Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of
the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964). See also Address
by A. A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, Law Advisory
Council Lecture, Notre Dame Law School, Nov. 20, 1974, in [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,010 (1974); Address by A. A. Sommer, Jr., Further Facts on "Going
Private," Second Annual Securities Seminar of the Detroit Institute for Continuing Legal
Education, March 14, 1975, in 294 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-I (March 19, 1975). See
generally Bialkin, Fraud, Inside Information and Fiduciary Duty under Rule lob-5 (ALI-ABA
Conference), 298 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-12, A-13 (1975); Carter, Testimony before the
SEC's fact-finding investigation on beneficial ownership-Takeovers and Acquisition, in 281
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-8 (1975).
17. Vorenberg, supra note 16, at 1201.
18. Id. at 1202-03. The most advantageous time for a company to go private is when the
price of the company's stock is depressed. At that time, a higher value of the stock is
speculative and under such circumstances the appraisal process tends to produce conservative
results.
19. Id. at 1203. Forced liquidation exposes the minority stockholder to the capital gains tax
and prior to Jan. I, 1977, avoided the stepped up basis available to the stockholder's beneficiaries if he held the stock up to his death. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1023, 90 Stat. 1520, eliminated the stepped-up basis, and, thus, this disadvantage is no longer
applicable.
20. In some jurisdictions appraisal has been held to be an exclusive remedy, thus preventing the minority stockholders from seeking any other relief in state court. See, e.g., Stauffer v.
Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 9-10, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Beloff v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 1I,87 N.E.2d 561 (1949).
21. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 10-11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 305, 242 P.2d 1025, 1036 (1952).
22. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 1I,187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct.
1962). Lack of success in proving deception stems from the requirement that actual fraud be
proved, and, thus, a mere showing of unfairness is insufficient. Actual fraud requires proof of
concealment or misrepresentation of fact with the attendant burden of scienter. See generally
Cary, supra note 15; Comment, Corporate Freeze-Outs Effected by Merger: The Search for a
Rule, 37 U. Pirr. L. REV. 115 (1975).
23. The discovery rules under state law tend to be stricter than their federal counterparts.
See generally Bahlman, Rule lOb-5: The Case for Its Full Acceptance as Federal Corporation
Law, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 727 (1968). Stricter rules may thwart the plaintiff's cause because
cases involving detailed financial transactions are generally won or lost in discovery. I A.
BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 4.7 (120) (Supp. 1972-73).
24. Personal jurisdiction statutes of the states may make it difficult to serve process on the
myriad defendants involved in securities litigation. Thus, a plaintiff would have to bring several
actions in different jurisdictions, a procedure which is not only inconvenient and inefficient,
but expensive. See Patrick, Rule lOb-S. Equitable Fraud and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook:
Another Step in the Continuing Development of Federal Corporation Law, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457,
458-61 (1969).
25. Security for expenses statutes allow a defendant to demand that plaintiff post a bond as
a condition to maintaining a derivative suit, and to collect attorneys' fees against an unsuccessful plaintiff. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1976-77); TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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Thus, in the absence of an effective state remedy, the only alternative
available to the minority stockholder is to seek relief under the federal
securities laws.26
B. The Development of "New Fraud"
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the SEC to fill the gaps left by the
otherwise comprehensive antifraud rules which Congress had enacted in
1933 and 1934.27 The rule is drafted in broad language, but there is no written
record of what kind of conduct the SEC sought to prohibit by rule lOb-5.28
Congressional attention was focused primarily on insuring a climate of
fairness in the marketplace. 29 The attitude of the SEC was that fairness
could be achieved by maintaining free and open access to investment information.3 o Thus, the original application of rule l0b-5 was toward deception 3'
cases since the full disclosure of pertinent information theoretically removed any unfairness that might prevent equal bargaining between buyers
32
and sellers of securities.
The necessity of finding deception as a prerequisite to lOb-5 liability
proved a major obstacle when 10b-5 protection was sought in conflict
situations such as going private transactions.33 In some cases the deception
requirement was a complete bar to finding a lOb-5 violation. 34 In other cases
the courts were forced into creating legal fictions, such as substituting
shareholders in place of the corporation, 3 5 or holding the deception of a
director to be a deception of the corporation, 36 in order to allow lOb-5
claims. The rationale behind the latter decisions raised conceptual difficulties because traditional theory holds that the directors are the corporation
37
and a corporation, like a person, cannot deceive itself.
26. The federal rules of procedure would eliminate a plaintiff's procedural problems if
federal substantive law provided a cause of action. F. O'NEAL, supra note 1I,§ 5.29; O'Neal &
Janke, supra note II, at 343-45.
27. I A. BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 2.2 (420) (Supp. 1970-71).
28. Id.
29. The preamble to the 1934 Act states that regulation and control of securities dealings is
necessary "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions." 15
U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970).
30. Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1119 (1969).
31. "Deception" is used here to encompass both misrepresentation and nondisclosure. See
I A. BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 4.7 (541) (Supp. 1972-73).
32. Comment, supra note 30, at 1119.
33. I A. BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 4.7 (542) (Supp. 1972-73).
34. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964) (court held rule lOb-5
inapplicable to breach of fiduciary duty where breach does not involve deception).
35. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (deception found by viewing
fraud as though independent shareholders who were deceived were standing in place of
defrauded corporate entity).
36. See, e.g., Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) (allegation that
corporation has been or may be defrauded into issuing or selling securities through the failure or
refusal of some directors fully to disclose to remaining directors material facts concerning
transactions or financial condition of the corporation states a cause of action under rule lOb-5).
37. Comment, supra note 30, at 1104 n.10. These decisions were also criticized on the
grounds that such holdings hindered an effective use of rule lOb-5 in the corporate sector.
lOb-5 [should] be applied where necessary for the protection and facilitation of
an investment decision. [Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970)]. However, to continue to accomplish this all-too-apparent goal through the machinery of
deception is to continue to hide the real consideration under the rubric of
materiality. Furthermore, because the concepts of misrepresentation and deceit
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The Second Circuit rejected the traditional deception requirement for a
finding of fraud under rule lOb-5 in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.3 There,
Aquitane Company of Canada, Ltd. became the controlling shareholder of
Banff Oil, Ltd. and placed three of its representatives on Banff's eight-man
board of directors. Prior to announcing a major oil discovery, Banff's board
of directors authorized the sale of treasury stock to Aquitane at a price far
below what the stock traded for immediately after news of the oil find was
released. A derivative action was brought on behalf of Banff, and, in ruling
on the pleadings, the en banc court held that where it is alleged that one
corporation exercised a controlling influence over another corporation,
causing it to issue its stock at an inordinately low price, a violation of rule
10b-5(c) 39 is stated.40 Although the court used some ambiguous language, 4 1
the decision is generally read as establishing "unfairness" plus "control" 4 2
as a separate violation of rule lOb-5, as distinguished from a finding of
43
"deception."
The holding in Schoenbaum that activity other than deception constituted
fraud under rule lOb-5 became known as "new fraud." 44 New fraud signified a judicial awakening to the fact that minority stockholders in conflict
transactions are vulnerable to securities frauds which would not threaten
stockholders in general. 45 This realization spread to the other circuits where
46
the new fraud theory was also adopted.
The advancement of new fraud suffered a setback when the Second
are anchored in the law of torts, which provides rigidly defined elements of
those causes of action, the continued emphasis upon deception will perpetuate
the requirements of reliance and causation, concepts ill-suited to a charge of
fraud upon a corporation or its stockholders.
Cox, Fraud is in the Eyes of the Beholder: Rule lOb-5's Application to Acts of Corporate
Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 674, 699 (1972) (citations omitted).
38. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240. IOb-5(c) (1975). For text of this clause see note 4 supra.
40. 405 F.2d at 219.
41. After giving the holding of the court, Judge Hays continued, "Moreover, Aquitane and
the directors of Banff were guilty of deceiving the stockholders of Banff (other than
Aquitane)." Id. at 220 (emphasis added). Some have read this passage as limiting the effect of
Schoenbaum. See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
42. "Control" is a term of art in securities law. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(f) (1975). See
also I L. Loss. SECURITIEs REGULATION 770, 778-79 (2d ed. 1961); Note, The Controlling
Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Management Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 103435 (1973).
43. I A. BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 4.7 (623) (Supp. 1974) and authorities cited therin,
especially Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 57-61 (1973). Adding to this view is the disposition
by the court of a claim against a third party who had purchased Banff stock through an arm'slength transaction. The court indicated the most important factor in dismissing the complaint as
to the third party was "there is no reason to believe that Paribas was in any position to influence
the judgment of the Banff directors by any improper means." 405 F.2d at 219. But see
Solomon, supra note 16, at 163-64.
44. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 (2d Cir. 1972).
45. Comment, supra note 30, at 1117. The Supreme Court appeared to support the result
reached in Schoenbaum in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971). In upholding a lOb-5 claim by stockholders of a company against a group of investors
who purchased the company and then paid for the transaction by fraudulent conversion of the
company's assets, the Court found that the company "was injured as an investor through a
deceptive device which deprived it of any compensation for the sale of its valuable block of
securities." Id.at 10.
46. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1970); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865,
869-70 (3d Cir. 1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
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Circuit created an exception to the "controlling influence and unfair terms"
test to determine lOb-5 liability in the case of Popkin v. Bishop.47 The
dispute in Popkin centered around a merger of Bell Intercontinental Corporation into its controlling stockholder, the Equity Corporation, on terms that
the plaintiff, a minority stockholder of Bell, alleged to be "grossly inadequate" for Bell and its stockholders.48 Since, however, state law had required a shareholder vote and plaintiffs conceded full disclosure, the court
refused to grant injunctive relief.49 The court held that once shareholder
approval was "fairly sought and freely given, the principal federal interest is
at an end." ' 50 Further, full disclosure would arm the shareholders with
51
sufficient information to sue for an injunction under state law.
Some commentators read Popkin as invalidating the new fraud holding in
Schoenbaum and reinstituting deception as a necessary requirement for a
finding of lOb-5 liability.52 The Popkin opinion's emphasis on the decision's
narrow grounds,53 the gaps in the logic of the decision,5 4 and a subsequent
Second Circuit case,55 indicated, however, that Popkin's characterization of
"non-disclosure as a key issue in rule lOb-5 cases" has not overruled
Schoenbaum. Popkin left a great deal of uncertainty as to how much weight
was to be given to the "controlling influence and unfair terms test" and the
extent to which nondisclosure would be actionable. 6 The strongest statement that could be made was that full disclosure still remained the most
57
effective means of avoiding lOb-5 liability.
47. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
48. Id. at 717.
49. The court took issue with the proposition that rule lOb-5 is more than a disclosure rule.
After quoting Judge Hays' language in Schoenbaum (see note 41 supra), the court opined:
Thus it seems clear that our emphasis on improper self-dealing did not eliminate
non-disclosure as a key issue in rule lOb-5 cases. [That rule is] designed principally to impose a duty to disclose and inform rather than become enmeshed in
passing judgments on information elicited. . . .This design has special relevance to merger transactions that, under state law, must be subjected to shareholder approval. In the context of such transactions, if federal law ensures that
shareholder approval is fairly sought and freely given, the principal federal
interest is at an end. Underlying questions of the wisdom of such transactions or
even their fairness become tangential at best of federal regulation.
464 F.2d at 719-20.
50. Id. at 720.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Note, Securities Regulations-The Reincarnation of the Deception Requirement, 51 N.C.L. REV. 942 (1973).
53. E.g., Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1972) (the rarity of concession of full
disclosure by plaintiffs and the mandatory shareholder vote).
54. Equity was a controlling stockholder, thereby rendering the stockholder vote a
foregone conclusion. Thus, how can it be said that "shareholder approval" was "freely
given?" Further, when the approval is certain and the terms are unfair it is doubtful that such
approval is "fairly sought." I A. BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 4.7 (626)(3) (Supp. 1974). See
generally Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 297, 302-03 (1974); Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 in the
Regulation of Corporate Management, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 27, 72-73, 88-92 (1973); Note, The
Controlling Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1007 (1973).
55. See. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), noted in 63
CALIF. L. REV. 563 (1975).

56. Compare University Capital Corp. v. Barbara Lynn Stores, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,949 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), with Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp.
1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and Levine v. Biddle Sawyer Corp., 383 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
57. Kaufman v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Tanzer Economic Assocs. v.
Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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The SEC was also concerned with the plight of the minority stockholder in
"going private" transactions.5 8 The Commission had proposed alternative
rules calling for full disclosure, an independently determined fair price, and
a business purpose, before a company went private. 9 The full disclosure
and fair price requirements were fairly explicit, but the business purpose
requirement was left undefined. 6 The reasoning behind the latter move
appears to permit the SEC to make case-by-case determinations of valid
business purposes or to adopt the formulations of the courts. 61 The requirement has been most fully developed in the Fifth Circuit, 62 but whether it
would act as a deterrent to improper "going private" transactions remains
doubtful, as it seems likely that any corporation could construct a suitable
'63
justification for "going private."
Despite the inequities of the short form merger, and the response of the
judiciary and the Commission to problems in the going private area, 64 the
prospect of an expansive. interpretation of rule 1Ob-5 by the Supreme Court
to provide relief for minority stockholders was doubtful. In light of recent
decisions announced by the court, 65 the probability of new fraud being
extended to short form mergers was small.'

II.

SANTA FE INDUSTRIES, INC.

v.

GREEN

Plaintiff's complaint in Santa Fe alleged unfairness in the valuation of
Kirby stock and breach of the majority stockholders' duty to deal fairly with
the minority. 67 The Supreme Court refused to hold that such allegations
68
alone gave rise to a cause of action under rule lOb-5 and section 10(b).
58. Sommer, supra note 16.
59. Proposed rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1132, 40
Fed. Reg. 7947, 7950-52 (1975). Both proposed rules require detailed disclosures and fair terms
determined by an independent third party.,The latter proposed rule sets forth the requirement
for a business purpose. For a discussion of the proposed rules see Moore, supra note 8, at 36265; Solomon, supra note 16, at 172-76.
60. See Moore, supra note 8, at 362-75; Solomon, supra note 16, at 172-76.
61. The business purpose test received mixed support from the bench. See generally Kerr,
Going Private: Adopting a Corporate PurposeStandard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33 (1975).
62. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844
(1974); Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974) (the
desire of the parent corporation to eliminate potential claims of conflicts of interest with its
subsidiaries was a valid business purpose for the proposed merger), noted in Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699 (1975). See
also 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 11. 154 (rev. ed. 1976).
63. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 172 (2d ed. 1970); Stone, A Corporation'sRepurchase of its Own Shares, 49 L.A. B.
BULL. 106, 109-10 (1974).

64. See the concurring opinion of Judge Mansfield inGreen v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d
1283, 1294 (2d Cir. 1976), for a review of going private problems.
65. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926, 51 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1977); TSC Indus.,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
66. A Supreme Court affirmance of the Second Circuit opinions could properly be viewed
as an extension of the "new fraud" doctrine even though the lower court had added the
requirements of business purpose and prior notice to the Schoenbaum test. Such affirmance
would have indicated that proof of deception is not necessary to a l0b-5 claim in the proper
case, a decision which no court of appeals had rendered prior to Santa Fe. Most courts had
supported their decisions by finding deception as an alternative holding. See 89 HARV. L. REV.
1917, 1926 (1976).
67. 97 S. Ct. at 1297-98, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 488.
68. Id. at 1301, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
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Justice White's majority opinion 69 reflected the same attitude of the Court
towards rule lOb-5 as evidenced in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores7" and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.71 Section 10(b)'s "plain meaning" 72 policy considerations behind that language 73 constitute the grounds
upon which the decision was based.
In Ernst & Ernst the Court stated that whether a cause of action exists
under rule lOb-5 depends upon the language of section 10(b). Thus, the
foundation for the Santa Fe decision had been laid. 74 The opinion focused

on the words "manipulative or deceptive" as used in section 10(b), 75 and
found them to limit the reach of rule lOb-5; the Securities and Exchange
Commission has no power to adopt a rule whose scope exceeds congressional will as expressed in the statute. Thus limited, the majority determined that

the word "fraud" in rule IOb-5 could not be read as encompassing breaches
of fiduciary duty that happen to occur in connection with a securities
transaction.7 6 Only if a claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in a transaction
were fairly viewed as manipulative or deceptive would a cause of action be
stated under the rule. Accepting the district court's finding that no minority
77
the
shareholders were deceived in the short form merger transaction,
78
stated.
was
IOb-5
rule
of
Court concluded that no violation
Because deception was not involved, the Court distinguished all the cases
relied upon by the court of appeals in finding liability. 79 The majority simply

stated that in each of the breaches of fiduciary duty in the cases relied on by
the court of appeals there existed an element of deception. Thus, in one
80
sentence the Court ended the long debate on the existence of new fraud.
The majority opinion also found no "manipulation," a virtual term of art

when used in relation to securities." Manipulation was defined by the Court
as artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors. 2 Since
69. White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C.J. and Stewart,
Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J., joined, and in all but Part IV of which Blackmun and
Stevens, J.J., joined. Blackmun and Stevens, J.J., filed opinions concurring in part. Brennan,
J.,filed a dissenting opinion.
70. 421 U.S. 723 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 951 (1975).
71. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
72. "Plain meaning" refers to the principal basis of Justice Powell's majority opinion in
Ernst & Ernst in which he put primary reliance on the actual language of the statute. Id. at 20001.
73. See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text.
74. 97 S. Ct. at 1300, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 491.
75. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it"unlawful for any person . . . to use or employ
• . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of [Securities
Exchange Commission Rules]." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
76. 97 S. Ct. at 1300, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 491.
77. That finding centered upon the data contained in an Information Statement prepared
for defendant Santa Fe in contemplation of the merger. The statement included an appraisal of
all the assets of Kirby and an opinion letter by Morgan Stanley and Co. which set a valuation on
the stock of Kirby. 533 F.2d 1283, 1288 (2d Cir. 1976).
78. 97 S. Ct. at 1301, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
79. Id.
80. The Court's statement is correct on its face, but it ignores the basis upon which new
fraud was founded. Each of the cases cited by the Court did include an element of deception.
Deception, however, was generally an alternative holding. Most of the discussion in the
opinions centered on whether deception needed to be alleged at all. See Judge Medine's
majority opinion in the court below. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). By reading the cases as it
does, the Court is declaring, in effect, that the new fraud rationale is unfounded.
81. 97 S. Ct. at 1302, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 493-94.
82. The Court tied the word manipulation to practices such as wash sales, matched orders,
and rigged prices. Id.
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nondisclosure is so closely tied to manipulation, in that deception is necessary to the success of a manipulative scheme, and both are the principal
target of section 10(b), the Court concluded that Congress did not intend the
of corporate mismanagement where the
statute to be used against instances
83
only claim is unfair treatment.
The second basis for the decision, the policy considerations behind the
language of section 10(b), is presented in Part IV of the Court's opinion.
Despite the assertion that the language of the section is dispositive, the
Court went on to discuss additional factors which weighed heavily against a
finding of 1Ob-5 liability. First, the majority dealt with the philosophy of full
disclosure which the Court has described as the fundamental purpose of the
Act." 4 Since the Court interpreted the purpose of rule 1Ob-5 as a vehicle to
ensure full disclosure rather than as a standard for judging the fairness of
what was fully disclosed, the Court declined to allow a lOb-5 action based on
allegedly unfair terms. 85
Secondly, the Court held that expanding the scope of rule lOb-5 to cover
breaches of fiduciary duty would encroach on an area traditionally relegated
to state law. 8 6 Cort v. Ash 87 had made it clear that unless federal law
expressly creates a duty on the part of a director, state law governs the
internal affairs of the corporation. Since the facts of the instant case showed
only corporate mismanagement, the Court was satisfied that it was entirely
appropriate for the minority shareholders to pursue appraisal under the
Delaware statute. 88
Justices Blackmun and Stevens both filed opinions concurring in all but
Part IV of the majority's opinion. 89 Blackmun's disagreement with Part IV
was based on his dissents in Blue Chip Stamps and Ernst & Ernst.90 Stevens
refused to concur in Part IV for the reasons stated in Blackmun's dissent in
Blue Chip Stamps and his own dissent in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries.9
Justice Brennan dissented for substantially the same reasons expressed in
the majority and concurring opinions in the Second Circuit Court of Ap92
peals.
Santa Fe is consistent with recent Supreme Court securities cases in the
same sense as the majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst had a "certain technical
consistency.- 93 Both cases display an attitude on the part of the Court
83. !d.
84. Id.
85. Id.

86. Id.
87. 422 U.S. 78, 80 (1975).
88. 97 S. Ct. at 1301, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 492.
89. 97 S. Ct. at 1304, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 496.
90. 421 U.S. 723, 761 (1975); 425 U.S. 185, 215 (1976). Justice Blackmun was chiefly
concerned with the policy considerations used to reach a decision. He felt that the proper route
was to interpret the language of the statute which he felt properly conveyed a broad remedial
design.
91. 97 S. Ct. at 1304-05, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 496-97. Justice Stevens was of the opinion that
securities legislation must be interpreted in light of the basic policy of the Act to provide
protection to investors.
92. 97 S. Ct. at 1304, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 496.
93. Justice Blackmun, in dissenting from the majority opinion in Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at
215, had described the majority reasoning as having a certain technical consistency. Id. at 216.
By saying that, Blackmun was admitting that so far as the Court's reasoning went it was
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towards securities legislation in general and rule lOb-5 in particular: the
securities laws will not be used as a cure for all corporate ills.94 But in the
narrow reinterpretation of rule l0b-5, the Court is ignoring the history of the
problems before it.
By accenting disclosure, the Court fails to come to grips with the real
issue in conflict situations. As pointed out earlier, 95 a going private short
form merger lacks any arm's-length qualities. Yet equal bargaining power
was Congress' goal in creating the disclosure requirement. It is anomalous
that the Supreme Court would decide that full disclosure removes the
federal question when the possession of the information disclosed does
nothing to improve the minority stockholder's bargaining position. 96 Because disclosure does not eliminate the basic unfairness of the terms disclosed, and since appraisal is not a realistic alternative,97 the Supreme
Court's decision in Santa Fe solves no problems in the going private area.
Rather, it creates a situation in which many problems will arise.
Santa Fe will be cited many times for the proposition that rule lOb-5
requires deception or manipulation before liability will be found. But what
deception means will be the subject of many lawsuits, just as it was before
new fraud was developed. The creation of new fraud was a direct result of a
dissatisfaction with the old deception requirement. 98 Lower courts strained
the definition of deception to cover fact situations which were not adequately covered by the 1934 conception of fraud. 99 In Schoenbaum the Second
Circuit sought to eliminate the need for the artificial use of deception by
deciding the issue without first stating the legal conclusion that the plaintiffs
were deceived."o
Santa Fe, by explicitly requiring a finding of deception or manipulation
will force the lower courts back into the same decisional pattern that gave
birth to new fraud in the first place.' 0' The Supreme Court admits that short
form mergers raise significant issues of fiduciary duty. 102 But in the absence
of effective state fiduciary standards and appraisal statutes that give a
minority stockholder a realistic chance of obtaining full value for his shares,
the lower courts will continue to fashion remedies with the tools at hand. In
the case of short form mergers the lower courts will state the facts and
conclude that deception existed. The result will be confusion as the illdefined term "deception" is used to determine lOb-5 liability.
logically correct, but it failed to consider either the context in which the problem arose or the
ultimate goal of protecting investors from victimization however it occurs. Since the decision in
Santa Fe relied almost totally on Ernst & Ernst, it is subject to the same criticism.
94. 97 S. Ct. at 1304, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 496.
95. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
96. Theoretically, a corporation could give its minority shareholders $.01 so long as it fully
disclosed all the information which led to that valuation. Under Santa Fe the minority shareholders would have no recourse against the majority by way of lOb-5.
97. See notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text.
98. See Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook: The "New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1969).
99. See notes 35 and 36 supra and accompanying text.
100. Comment, note 30 supra.
101. Thus, decisions will be subject to the same criticisms as were directed to the earlier
deception cases. See note 37 supra.
102. 97 S. Ct. at 1304, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 496.
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II1.
CONCLUSION
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green holds that no cause of action is stated
under rule lOb-5 unless the complaint alleges deception or manipulation. By
expressly requiring either deception or manipulation, the decision eliminates
new fraud as an alternative to finding lOb-5 liability. The result will be a
resurgence of confusion as the courts once again seek to decide whether a
given set of facts presents a case of deception or manipulation. Minority
stockholders of corporations engaged in going private transactions may still
find federal relief available, however, since lower courts will tend to conclude that deception or manipulation exists where the facts show severe
unfairness.
James V. Baird

